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Abstract
Why are some teams perennial darlings of sports journalists while other talented squads get
overlooked? Each week during the NCAA basketball season, the Associated Press releases a
ranked poll of the top 25 teams. By comparing the preseason and postseason rankings, we
construct a measure of how much sports journalists who respond to the poll overrate (or
underrate) college teams relative to their actual performance. Using this metric for the 115
NCAA schools that have appeared at least once in the opening or final AP poll in the last 25
years, we examine a range of institutional characteristics that may predict overrating or
underrating by members of the sports media. A multilevel analysis reveals that recent
performance in the NCAA tournament and the perceived quality of the most recent
recruiting class are the strongest predictors of being consistently overrated. While no
institutional characteristics had direct effects, the effect of tournament performance on
overrating is greater for teams that have historically had fewer coaches and compete in a
“power” conference, and for national research institutions with larger student bodies. Our
findings have implications for understanding how complex decisions are made within a
conservative social institution (the media) and suggest that some schools may receive
advantages in media exposure and financial opportunity.
Keywords: basketball, bias, colleges, journalism, media, rankings, sociology
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Introduction
Pre-game debates about which team is better, who's going to win, and by how much
are surely as old as sport itself. However, in the post-ESPN era of the past 35 years, judging
teams and predicting where they will end up by season's end has grown into sizable
industry. The unending debate about which squad is "the team to beat" is played out in
newspaper column inches, blog posts, and TV roundtable shows. For fans, these debates
offer another layer of entertainment between games. But for sports journalists, assessing a
large number of teams – before, during, and after the season – is a complex task, requiring
them to consider stat sheets, scouting reports, past performances, etc. Awash in data, what
mental shortcuts, assumptions, and forms of conventional wisdom do sports journalists use
that might bias their assessments of teams in one way or another?
In this study, we use data from the Associated Press's (AP) weekly ranked poll of the
top 25 NCAA men's basketball teams to examine patterns in sports journalists' assessments
of college teams. By comparing preseason and postseason rankings for the 115 NCAA teams
that have appeared in the AP poll at least once in the last 25 years, we ask: are certain
college basketball programs consistently overrated or underrated by the media at the
beginning of the season relative to the end of the season? Next, we examine whether the
team's performances in past seasons or other characteristics of the institution are related to
the media's overrating or underrating college basketball programs. These findings allow us
to better understand how sports journalists make sense of a complex field of teams, but
also reveal which types of college teams are systematically overrated or underrated.
Literature Review
The AP college rankings started in 1936, with a within-season ranking of college
football teams in the interest of awarding national titles upon completion of the season
(Associated Press, 2015b). The preseason poll, a prognostic ranking taking place before the
season, was not introduced until 1950 (Ellis, 2013). On January 20th, 1949, the AP began
its seasonal ranking of men’s college basketball programs (which, unlike the football
ranking, does not play a direct role in determining postseason play). From the poll’s
inception until 1961 the AP only ranked the top 20 teams, and from 1962 to 1967
a maximum of 10 teams were ranked (College Poll Archive, 2015). The poll subsequently
returned to a 20 team ranking structure from 1968 to 1988, before expanding to the
current 25 teams in 1989 (Associated Press, 2015a).
The ranking methodology of the AP Basketball Poll, unlike other procedures (Sagarin,
2015), is relatively straightforward. Sixty-five voters submit their individual ranking of the
top 25 teams each week before and during the season. These voters consist of media
members covering college basketball for both national (e.g. ESPN, NPR) and local outlets
(e.g. The Gainesville Sun, New Haven Register), although the majority are locally based
sports journalists (Associated Press, 2015c). The ballots are scored by giving 25 points to
first place votes, 24 points for second place votes, and so on through one point for a 25th
place vote. The scores are then summed within teams, which gives the AP its weekly
basketball rankings.
The preseason ranking, then, represents the collective best guess of the sports press
about which teams will be the most successful in the upcoming season. The final ranking,
informed by a full slate of games, is a good indicator of how teams actually performed
during the regular season. Inside the locker room of any one team, there may be numerous
changes that make the team a different one in March than it was in November. Players build
chemistry or sustain injuries, develop greater confidence or face self-doubt. But in the
aggregate, these ups and downs over the course of season are a wash and most basketball
programs end up with more or less the team that started the season. As a result, in
comparing the preseason and postseason rankings, we get a sense of how accurate the
wisdom of the sports reporter crowd is in predicting which teams turn out to be winners.
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Following the Pack
Since NCAA rankings are produced by aggregating the votes of sports journalists, it
is important to consider the ways in which sports reporters structure their work and make
sense of a steady stream of scores, scouting reports, and almost daily mini-controversies.
While sociologists and media scholars have extensively documented the journalistic
production process more generally, sports reporting is a desperately understudied area
(Boyle, Rowe, and Whannel 2010). As Wanta (2013) has observed, “Sports has long been
one of the most highly read sections of the newspaper … [but it often] called the toy
department of newspapers” (76-77). Perhaps because sports are not seen as serious news,
the production of sports reporting is a vastly under-studied, under-theorized area (Wanta
2013; Silk and Amis 2000; Silk, Slack, and Amis 2000). However, by drawing together
existing research on journalistic practice and the small number of studies on sports
reporters, we can begin to understand the way in which sports journalism is structured and
some of the key assumptions of workers in the field.
Contrary to many cinematic portrayals of enterprising muckrakers, ethnographic
studies of newsrooms have consistently shown that journalists’ work is highly routinized,
constrained by editors’ definitions of types of information that are “newsworthy,” and
structured into the specialized world of “beats” (Gans 1979; Tuchman 1978; Harrison 2006;
Klinenberg 2005). One way reporters’ work is shaped is by the division of news production
into “beats” (Tuchman 1978). For Tuchman, assigning journalists to beats based on
geographic locations (e.g., neighborhoods), specific organizations (e.g., the mayor’s office),
and particular topics (e.g., sports) is means of generating news and pulling it into a
centralized “news net.” For journalists, these beats become a social setting and imply a set
of social relationships with other actors within that setting (Fishman 1980).
As with other “beat” reporters, sports journalists grow accustomed to routine
reliance on particular sources. McCleneghan (1997) surveyed 215 sports columnists in cities
over 100,000, finding that rank their own “intuitive feelings” and assessments of sporting
events as most important to their evaluations. However, after their own impressions, the
columnists ranked athletes and fellow colleagues as the most important sources for forming
opinions. The next set of sources in importance were “official sources” like coaches, team
management, and sports information directors, which were far more influential than
unofficial sources like fans’ opinions and talk show call-ins (although the “official source” of
sports agents were ranked lowest of all, below even “strangers with tips”). The clear
implication of these findings is that beyond their own reflections, sports journalists form
opinions in consultation with other reporters and through interviews with official sources.
As a result, sports journalists often adopt what Coakley (2007) refers to as a “pack
mentality,” sharing “conventional wisdom” about team quality, players’ ability, and locker
room chemistry. This kind of consensus and routine-thinking help explain the welldocumented tendency of sports reporters towards clichés (Wanta and Leggett 1988). With
the introduction of online social media, like Twitter, which allow for continuous interactions
among athletes and sports reporters throughout the day, the “echochamber effect” may be
even more severe. As Hutchins (2011) writes, “the speed and sheer amount of
tweets…makes it difficult to follow their content without sacrificing time that can be spent
completing other journalistic tasks” (246).
Given this bias toward the “pack mentality,” we would expect to find that some
college basketball programs are reliably overrated and some consistently underrated. To be
sure, some colleges and universities do consistently have better teams. The University of
Kentucky’s team tends to be rated highly because the Wildcats are an excellent team in
most years. However, by using a difference score (between preseason and postseason
rank), the current study explores not whether some teams are usually ranked highly (which
is certainly true), but whether the field of sports journalists who vote in the poll misjudge
certain teams in a systematic fashion.

SPORT & SOCIETY
How Sports Reporters Assess Teams
If, indeed, sports journalists’ assessments of teams are systematically biased, what
are some of the shared assumptions that drive these persistent misjudgments?
One possibility is an establishment bias. Among the most firmly held principles,
especially in American media, is the “objectivity norm” or the belief that reporting ought to
be sanitized of all opinion. Shoemaker and Reese (1995) argue that the commitment to
objectivity today reflects a defensive posture against charges of “media bias.” Sports
reporters are allowed more room to assert opinions than, say, political reporters. Still, being
perceived as “objective” and not a “fan” is essential for any sports journalist hoping to
establish credibility. Safe, conservative assertions that historically successful teams will
perform well may seem less like advocacy than suggesting that unestablished team will
thrive. For this reason, teams in elite conferences, those with a longstanding coach, and
those with a historical record of success in the NCAA tournament might benefit from an
establishment bias in the eyes of journalists, leading to overrating in the AP poll.
Looming large in NCAA basketball’s calendar is the annual tournament and its
associated seasonal malady, March Madness. Another possible source of overrating in the
AP poll is due to a recency bias in response to the results of the previous year’s tournament.
The work of sports reporters has been radically transformed by the growth of the “sportsmedia complex” (Jhally 1984). Perhaps unsurprisingly, as early as the late 1980s, several
studies demonstrated the way in which television coverage of sporting events aim to create
“spectacle” by constructing powerful narratives around the teams and players in order to
boost ratings (MacNeill 1996; Gruneau 1989). McNeill (1996), for example, examined how
CTV (Canada) used the 1988 Winter Olympics in Calgary to engage in “power plays for
ratings, profit, and cultural significance in a competitive North American broadcasting
industry” (104). In fact, “great festivals of sports,” like the Olympics and the World Cup
internationally and the World Series, Super Bowl, the NBA Playoffs, and March Madness in
the U.S., have become exceedingly common (Carrington 2004). These great spectacles
assume a larger position in our collective memory and the vivid memory of recent success
may lead sports reporters to overrate the team’s prospects for the new season. If teams’
performance in the previous year’s NCAA tournament is strongly associated with overrating
in the AP poll, it would be strong evidence of a recency bias.
Like other journalists, sports reporters’ work is driven by an immediate sense of
what is “newsworthy.” Past research shows that sports coverage tends to emphasize “hot”
players – those currently enjoying success or that otherwise have compelling narratives.
Fortunato (2008) argues that the NFL has consciously structured its programming schedule
and press conferences to guide sports reporters toward covering particularly successful and
appealing players. Analyses of sports coverage have long shown that even in team sports,
journalists tend to focus on individual athletes (Williams 1977; Duncan and Brummett
1987). As a consequence, we would suspect that sports journalists would overestimate the
contribution of new star recruits. Such an effect is a form of star bias.
There may also be forms of institutional bias associated with characteristics of the college or
university itself. Whether the institution is a national or regional university or a liberal arts
college may well affect its media visibility. Sports journalists might also discount basketball
programs at colleges and regional universities as lacking the resources to be effective
competitors. Institutional factors such as the size of the student body, the size of the metro
area where the school is located, and the region of the country may affect journalists’
assessments. Media outlets tend to be located in urban areas and especially concentrated in
the Northeast. Consequently, there may be a navel-gazing effect with journalists being
biased toward the hometown team. If observed, all of these effects would be a type of
institutional bias.
We might also ask whether the recency bias is particularly strong for certain types of
institutions. Perhaps college teams that typically suffer at the hand of the establishment or
institutional biases gain special benefit from the recency bias. For example, if teams from
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non-power conferences are generally discounted by journalists, it is possible that a deep run
in the tournament might particularly boost their reputation in the minds of the sports press.
The current study examines this issue by modeling interactions between the previous year’s
tournament performance and the number of all-time Final Four appearances, the number of
recent coaches, membership in a power conference, type of college or university, size of the
student and metropolitan area populations, and geographic region of the country. Such
effects would be interactions between the recency and institutional or establishment biases.
By examining patterns of overrating and underrating in the AP poll of the top 25 NCAA
basketball teams, this study allows us to observe forms of bias built into contemporary
sports journalism. The stakes here may be low compared to claims of bias in political
reporting. Still, evidence of the establishment and institutional biases would suggest a selfreproducing cycle of boosterism for perennial favorites, while documented recency and star
biases would indicate a tendency toward faddish reporting over more serious assessment.
Such patterns may not only mislead fans, but also underrepresent plucky teams, playing
great basketball, that deserve coverage.
Methods
The data set for this study was created using a variety of sources, which are detailed
below in the description of variables. The first step was to compile all the NCAA Division I
teams that were ranked in at least one preseason or postseason Associated Press basketball
poll in the 25 seasons between 1989-90 and 2013-14. This resulted in 115 unique college
basketball teams and 2875 (25 x 115) team-seasons. The preseason poll generally comes
out in mid-November before any regular season (i.e., non-exhibition) games are played,
and the postseason poll is issued in mid-March before the conference and championship
tournaments (e.g., NCAA, NIT, etc.) begin (College Poll Archive, 2015). The 1989-90 season
was the first year the AP basketball poll expanded to 25 teams (Associated Press, 2015a),
which presented a logical starting point for examining the data.
Variables
The dependent variable (rank difference) was calculated by subtracting each team’s
postseason rank from its preseason rank for all of 25 years of polling data (College Poll
Archive, 2015). Therefore, positive scores on the dependent variable indicate that a team
improved its poll rank over the course of the season, while negative scores represent a
decline in rank. In any given poll, only 25 teams are ranked, so the remaining 90 teams
were assigned scores of “26” to allow for the calculation of rank difference for every team in
every year. This strategy actually provides for the most conservative estimate of change in
polling rank because it allows every unranked team to be slotted just outside the official poll
with a “rank” of 26.
Like the outcome, two of the independent variables, tournament performance and
recruiting rank, were measured at the season level (n = 2875). Tournament performance
was an ordinal variable that assessed how far teams advanced in the prior year’s NCAA
basketball tournament (HoopsTournament.Net, 2015). It ranged from 0 = did not play in
the tournament to 7 = won a national championship, increasing by a point for each
additional round a team progressed in the tournament (e.g., 1 = played but lost in the first
round and 6 = played but lost in the championship game). Data on recruiting rank was
taken from the Rivals news service (Rivals.com, 2015), which provides comprehensive
coverage of men’s college football and basketball recruiting developments. Rivals generates
ranked lists of the perceived quality of both individual recruits and the incoming classes of
individual teams; here, we relied on the team rankings, which listed what Rivals considered
to be the best 25 incoming classes for each year from 2003-04 to 2013-14. Recruiting data
were not available before 2003, but this does not change the effective sample size for the
analyses; since recruiting rank was added as a fixed effect (see analytic strategy below), we
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used the aggregated association within team from all available recruiting rank data across
all of years.
The remaining independent variables were measured at the team level (n = 115).
All-time Final Four appearances was tabulated as the number of times in history a team
reached the national semifinals of the NCAA tournament dating back to the first tournament
held in 1939 through the most recent tournament in the data set in 2014
(HoopsTournament.Net, 2015). The number of coaches a team had during the study years
(1989-2014) was gathered from school athletics websites and newspaper reports. Schools
that were members of the traditionally influential Atlantic Coast, Big 12, Big Ten, Pacific-12,
or Southeastern conferences were designated as power conference teams (Bennett, 2014).
The designation of a school as a regional university, liberal arts college, or national
university was taken from the categories published by U.S. News & World Report (2015) in
their “Best Colleges” list. The student population was measured using the combined number
of undergraduate and graduate students at each campus gathered from school websites.
The metro area population in which the school was located was taken from the 2010 U.S.
Census (United States Census Bureau, 2015b). The region (Midwest, South, West, or
Northeast) in which the school was located was determined using the U.S. Census’s basic
geographic grouping of states (United States Census Bureau, 2015a).
Analytic Strategy
To address the question of whether there was a consistent “mismatch” between
preseason and postseason rankings over time, and to identify which teams were most likely
to be overrated or underrated, we first provided an average difference between preseason
and postseason rank for all 115 teams across all 25 years of study data. We subtracted
postseason rank from preseason rank so that positive changes in rank difference
represented teams who overachieved relative to preseason expectations (i.e., were
underrated). In subsequent analyses, we transformed the simple rank difference by dividing
it by 25 (i.e., a positive .04-point change in rank difference is equivalent to moving up one
spot in the poll). This transformation reduced the likelihood of modeling problems in the
regression analyses (described below), but did not affect the substantive interpretation of
the effects. Recruiting rank was similarly reversed and transformed for consistency (i.e., a
score of 1.00 was equivalent to the top-ranked class that year, while .96 represented the
second ranked team, .04 represented the 25th ranked team, and a score of .00 was given
to all unranked teams). In the next two steps, we then provided the mean, range, and
standard deviation for each variable, as well as the bivariate correlations among all the
variables, to further describe our data.
The final step in the analysis was a multivariate regression to ascertain which
predictors had significant independent effects on the outcome in the presence of all other
independent variables. The structure of the data was multilevel in nature, with seasons
(Level 1; n = 2875) “nested” within teams (Level 2; n = 115), so we relied on a two-level
analysis using HLM 7.00 (Raudenbusch, Bryk, and Congdon, 2011). We first began with an
unconditional model to assess the overall amount of variance in the dependent variable at
each level of analysis (not shown). The first regression model included all the independent
variables (at Level 1 and Level 2) in the model simultaneously. In subsequent models, we
tested cross-level interactions to determine whether the slope of tournament performance
(Level 1) was moderated by any of the Level 2 variables (i.e., the slopes for tournament
performance were modeled as random effects). To keep our models parsimonious, we did
not test cross-level interactions between the other Level 1 variable (recruiting rank) and the
Level 2 predictors, as we did not have strong a priori hypotheses regarding the potential
interaction effects of recruiting rank (i.e., the slopes for recruiting rank were modeled as
fixed effects).
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Results
Table 1 orders all 115 teams in the study by the average difference between their
preseason and postseason rank across 25 years of AP polls (1990-2014). Because average
rank differences were calculated by subtracting postseason rank from preseason rank,
positive scores represent teams that improved their ranking over the course of the season.
In other words, the more positive the scores, the more underrated the teams were. In
contrast, as scores become increasingly negative, teams were more overrated over the
course of the 25 years of study data. For example, the Wisconsin Badgers were the most
underrated team in the study, improving their ranking by an average of 2.40 spots from the
preseason to the postseason poll. At the other end of the table, the UCLA Bruins were the
most overrated team, finishing 4.28 points lower, on average, in the final poll compared to
where they ranked before the season began. Teams in the middle of table, such as Syracuse
and Mississippi State, tended to be “properly rated” by the voters, with little or no difference
on average between their preseason and postseason rankings. Overall, the table indicates
there is a tendency to consistently overrate some teams and underrate others, although the
actual level of mismatch between preseason and postseason rankings could be
characterized as modest.
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Descriptive statistics for the study variables are reported in Table 2. The mean of the
rank difference variable is .00 because it represents a “zero sum” score across all the
teams. Every team that has ever been ranked in a preseason or postseason poll in the past
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25 years is included in the data, so any team that drops out of the poll is necessarily
replaced by another team in the study that moves into the poll, and vice versa; therefore,
the average change for all 115 teams across 25 years is exactly zero. The range is identical
to what is shown in Table 1 after a slight transformation, in that the minimum score of .171 represents UCLA (25 x -.171 = -4.28) and the maximum score of .096 represents
Wisconsin (25 x .096 = 2.40). The standard deviation shows that the average team differs
from the mean of “no change” between preseason and postseason scores by about one rank
position (25 x. 04 = 1), which again shows that there is some modest variation to be
explained in rank difference from preseason to postseason.

The mean for tournament performance is .93, indicating that an average team in an
average year essentially made it into the NCAA tournament but lost in the opening round.
The range and standard deviation show substantial variation in average tournament
performance, indicating that some teams have been infrequent participants in the
tournaments, while others usually advance to the middle and later rounds. The mean
recruiting rank score is .11, indicating that the average team had a recruiting class ranked
as about the 22nd best across the years of available data (25 – (.11 x 25) = 22.25).
As for the remaining (Level 2) variables in Table 2, the average team in the study
has made fewer than one all-time appearance in the Final Four of the NCAA tournament and
has had slightly over four coaches in the 25 years of the study. Sixty percent of the teams
compete in one of the NCAA’s “Power Five” athletic conferences, and the majority (83%) of
schools are considered to be national research universities. The average student body size is
just over 24,000, and the average school is located in a metropolitan area of about two
million people. The largest number of teams (42%) is located in the South, with just 14% of
schools found in the Northeast, and 22% each in the Midwest and West.
Table 3 is a matrix for the bivariate correlations among all study variables. As in
Table 2, the scores for rank difference, tournament performance, and recruiting rank are
averaged across all available years to create a single score on each variable for each of the
115 teams. The table shows that rank difference is significantly and negatively correlated
with tournament performance, recruiting rank, Final Four appearances, power conference,
and student population. This indicates that teams are more likely to be overrated when they
have done well in recent NCAA tournaments, have signed better recruiting classes, have
historically made deep runs in the tournament, play in a prestigious athletic conference, and
have larger student bodies. At the bivariate level, at least, over half of the hypothesized
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factors included in this study appear to be significantly related to overrating or underrating
teams.

Table 4 is a multilevel regression model with rank difference as the dependent
variable. Model 1 includes all Level 1 and Level 2 independent variables in the study, which
addresses whether each predictor has an independent effect on the outcome while
controlling for all other independent variables. We consider a variable to have a statistically
significant effect only when the regression coefficient itself is significant and there is
statistically significant reduction in prediction error compared to a model that does not
include the variable. The p-values of the t-tests for each variable are reported in the table
next to each significant coefficient, and the proportional reduction in prediction error (PRPE)
and chi-square tests for each model are reported at the bottom of the table.
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At Level 1, as hypothesized, both tournament performance and recruiting rank are
significantly and negatively related to rank difference, independently of one another and of
all other team and school characteristics in the model. In other words, teams that have had
recent success in the NCAA tournament are more likely to be overrated, as are teams with
more highly prized incoming player classes. For each additional round a team advances in
the previous year’s NCAA tournament, they can expect to be overrated by about half a spot
in the subsequent year’s polls (25 x .021 = .53), a relatively sizable effect. The effect of
recruiting rank is weaker; if a team were to improve its recruiting rank from unranked to
the middle of ranked recruiting classes, it would predict being overrated by just less than
one spot in the polls (13 x .069 = .90). Combined, the two Level 1 variables improved the
model’s predictive ability by nearly 8%.
At Level 2, none of the independent variables significantly improves the predictive
power of the model according to the reported chi-square test for model fit; while the
coefficient for number of coaches is significant, it does not significantly reduce prediction
error, therefore we consider it to be nonsignificant. In sum, recent success in the NCAA
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tournament and in recruiting is predictive of being overrated in the polls, but other
characteristics of the teams and schools are not directly related to the outcome.
Models 2 through 5 of Table 4 display the results from cross-level interactions
between tournament performance and the Level 2 predictors. These interactions address
the possibility that the effect of recent tournament performance may be stronger (or
weaker) for teams with certain characteristics than the “main effect” reported in Model 1. Of
the seven cross-level interactions tested, four showed both significant regression
coefficients and a significant improvement in model fit: number of coaches, power
conference, regional university (vs. national university), and student population.
In Model 2, the interaction between tournament performance and number of coaches
is positive, indicating there is a tendency to underrate teams based on their recent
tournament performance if they have had recent instability in the coaching position. Or put
another way, teams with long-tenured coaches are even more likely to be overrated when
they have had recent tournament success; stable teams get “extra credit” in the preseason
polls if they advanced deeply in the tournament the year before. Figure 1a depicts this
relationship graphically; the category of “fewer coaches” was defined by one standard
deviation below the mean number of coaches, and “more coaches” was one standard
deviation above. For all four graphs in Figure 1, rank difference is shown on the vertical axis
and tournament performance is displayed on the horizontal axis. Including the interaction
between tournament performance and number or coaches reduces the prediction error in
the model by over 6%.

Note: x-axis = tournament performance; y-axis = rank difference

Models 3 and 4 show that the effect of tournament performance depends on whether
a team belongs to a power conference and whether they are a regional university
(compared to a national university). The results are quite consistent, showing that the
overrating effect of tournament success is stronger for power conference teams and national
research universities. In fact, the effect of tournament performance actually switches
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direction across the two categories in each model: non-power conference teams remain
somewhat underrated the year following a strong tournament run (Figure 1b), as do teams
from regional universities (Figure 1c). The power conference effect is particular strong in
that it improves the model fit by over 37%; the interaction with regional university reduces
prediction error by over 8%.
Model 5 shows a negative interaction term between tournament performance and
student population, indicating that the overrating effect of recent tournament success is
stronger the larger schools become (Figure 1d). As with Figure 1a, the “smaller student
body” category represents schools one standard deviation below the mean student
population, while “larger student body” is one standard deviation above. This interaction
term improves the model fit by over 5%. In sum, these cross-level interactions show that
though none of the Level 2 variables is directly related to the outcome, they are still
influential as significant moderators of the effect of tournament performance on rank
difference.
Discussion
On the whole, the sports journalists voting in the AP poll do a remarkable job of
predicting where teams will end up at season’s end. Of the 115 teams ever ranked, 87
college teams had an average rank difference of one spot or less. In other words, over time,
they tend to be ranked as they ought to be, if we assume that voters do not become
unwilling to change their opinions about teams as the season progresses. In fact, preseason
rankings may be as predictive of postseason success as the postseason rankings are (Silver,
2011), indicating that basketball sportswriters are astute evaluators of teams’ eventual
potential. Still, there is the problem of the Badgers and the Bruins. This study finds a
durable pattern of AP poll voters overrating some teams, while underrating others. These
results offer us some insight into the mental shortcuts the pack of sports journalists use in
assessing a large and complex field of teams. But this is not merely an abstract issue. Media
coverage matters for colleges and their teams. While the effect may be modest, for any
given school, being underrated might have a number of consequences on and off the court.
Living in the Moment
For all the talk of legendary tournament runs of the past, sports journalists do not
seem to be biased in favor of colleges and universities with a historical track record of
tournament success. Nor was there much evidence of establishment or institutional biases
on their own. AP poll voters did not demonstrate favoritism to national universities, teams in
elite conferences, schools in a particular region or urban areas. The only evidence of
establishment bias on its own is a slight overrating of teams with stable coaching staff.
Instead, the results offer the most robust evidence for a recency bias in ranking teams. It is
the team’s performance in the most recent tournament that was most strongly and
consistently associated with overrating. Moreover, the study revealed several interactions
between the recency bias and other biases, but in the opposite direction of what might be
expected.
The tournament, rather than raising journalists’ expectations for underestimated
teams that perform well, produces a type of “Matthew Effect” (Merton, 1968), where the
already advantaged gain additional advantage. Colleges and universities in elite conferences
and long-term coaches that perform well in the previous year’s tournament are more
overrated than teams in non-elite conferences and with coaching changes. This effect
represents an interaction between the recency bias and the establishment bias. Similarly,
the underrating of regional universities that perform well in the tournament offers an
example of an interaction the recency bias and the institutional bias.
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Sports journalists are inherently biased against less established teams and less elite
institutions. Instead, these biases become relevant in the context of the NCAA tournament
as reporters cast their minds back to their most recent memory of teams. In recollecting the
tournament, more established teams from universities with national reputations may stand
out more vividly for any number reasons. For example, college programs in elite
conferences garner more media coverage from ESPN, Fox Sports, and others, regularly
refreshing the memories of fans as well as other sports journalists. Likewise, more
prominent teams may be deemed more capable of repeating a strong performance from
year to year than less established teams, whose recent success may be considered a fluke.
Another staple of off-season NCAA basketball coverage is an assessment of the
rookies. The results showed that sports journalists tend to overrate teams with stronger
incoming recruits, offering evidence of a star bias. It seems that, as a whole, sports
journalists overestimate the impact that new additions to the team will make.
Taken together, this study suggests that rather than defaulting to picking historically
successful teams or squads in power conference, sports journalists use two forms of recent
information: tournament performance and incoming recruits. Because the AP poll
aggregates the reporters’ votes, the findings are only indicative of the “pack” as a whole.
Future qualitative research with sports reporters ought to investigate their rationale behind
their votes, considering differences between national and local journalists. Nonetheless,
these finding represent an important advance in our understanding of how sports reporters
make judgments about teams.
Do the Rankings Matter?
It is no secret that college basketball is a highly profitable business. In the 2011-12
fiscal year, the NCAA itself brought in $871.6 million in revenue, “most of which came from
the rights agreement with Turner/CBS Sports” for the NCAA men’s basketball tournament
(NCAA, 2015). In 2009-10, men’s college basketball programs in the top 14 conferences
produced nearly $985 million dollars of their own revenue (Rishe, 2011).
While future research should focus directly on the financial implications of media bias
in the polls, we can speculate as to some ways being overrated or underrated could lead to
unequal distributions of revenues over time. Certainly, games between two “ranked” teams
are more attractive to television networks and their viewers, resulting in more visibility for
teams in the AP poll, particularly at the beginning of the season. Middle school and high
school players are often first exposed to potential college destinations through television,
providing a possible recruiting advantage for ranked teams. Fans themselves may be more
interested in attending games in person when their favorite team is ranked, thereby
increasing the program’s revenue. In general, appearing in the AP poll is one measure of
success in college athletics, which may allow athletic directors to justify funneling more
money into basketball programs that are consistently ranked.
As a result of these processes, the “Matthew Effect” may trigger a strong feedback
loop, as more highly visible teams bring in more highly rated recruits, have greater success
in the postseason, and end up overrated in the polls again the following year, when the
whole process repeats itself. Our results show that this may be especially true of programs
that are already viewed as stable, have high visibility inside and outside of the sports world,
and produce large numbers of alumni. This sports visibility may even affect schools overall
budgets, as recent research has provided some strong evidence that athletic department
success leads directly to increased alumni giving (Anderson, 2015.)
Conclusion
To our knowledge, this is the first study to examine the possibility that some college
basketball teams are overrated or underrated in the AP college basketball poll relative to
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their actual performance over the course of a season. We also explore whether there is any
patterned bias to this mismatch between preseason and postseason rankings. While we find
that, overall, AP poll voters assess teams’ abilities to a relatively accurate degree, there are
some teams that are consistently overrated or underrated. Our results suggest that this is
due to phenomenon in which voters overrate teams who have recently performed well in
postseason play or have signed a promising group of recruits. We also show that some
characteristics of the schools, including their prominence in both the athletic and academic
landscape, exacerbate this overrating effect. On one hand, this suggests that the ranking
process might be inherently unfair to certain basketball teams and schools. On the other
hand, sports often thrive off of perceived controversy, particularly when diehard fans feel
their teams have been somehow shortchanged or overlooked. Whether college athletic
programs and the journalists that cover them actually wish to address and correct the
biases identified here is a question left for future research.
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